Softmax Equilibria
1000 random starting points per β
β = 1.0 — 1 distinct fixed point
#1 basin: 1000/1000 (100.0%)
| Strategy | Frequency | Reward |
|---|
| mirror | 0.1983 | 6.8241 |
| cooperation-coalition | 0.1697 | 6.6682 |
| chivalry | 0.1419 | 6.4897 |
| conditional-cooperator | 0.1265 | 6.3744 |
| universalizability | 0.1107 | 6.2415 |
| anti-exploiter | 0.1107 | 6.2415 |
| intelligence | 0.0706 | 5.7918 |
| generous | 0.0557 | 5.5539 |
| selfish | 0.0159 | 4.3021 |
β = 5.0 — 1 distinct fixed point
#1 basin: 1000/1000 (100.0%)
| Strategy | Frequency | Reward |
|---|
| mirror | 0.3718 | 6.8680 |
| cooperation-coalition | 0.3144 | 6.8344 |
| conditional-cooperator | 0.2958 | 6.8222 |
| chivalry | 0.0133 | 6.2023 |
| anti-exploiter | 0.0017 | 5.7884 |
| universalizability | 0.0017 | 5.7884 |
| intelligence | 0.0013 | 5.7426 |
| generous | 0.0000 | 4.7682 |
β = 20.0 — 2 distinct fixed points
#1 basin: 783/1000 (78.3%)
| Strategy | Frequency | Reward |
|---|
| mirror | 0.3333 | 6.8680 |
| cooperation-coalition | 0.3333 | 6.8680 |
| conditional-cooperator | 0.3333 | 6.8680 |
#2 basin: 217/1000 (21.7%)
| Strategy | Frequency | Reward |
|---|
| mirror | 0.3005 | 6.8680 |
| chivalry | 0.1881 | 6.8446 |
| anti-exploiter | 0.1677 | 6.8388 |
| universalizability | 0.1677 | 6.8388 |
| generous | 0.1675 | 6.8388 |
| cooperation-coalition | 0.0085 | 6.6897 |
| conditional-cooperator | 0.0000 | 6.3353 |
| intelligence | 0.0000 | 6.3062 |