Round 29

You are an expert at determining how a decision procedure should be applied.

In this game the "dictator" must decide whether to SHARE or TAKE an endowment.
- **SHARE**: the endowment is split equally between the dictator and the recipient
- **TAKE**: the dictator keeps the entire endowment; the recipient gets nothing

You must follow only the dictator's strategy. The recipient's strategy is provided
because the dictator's decision procedure may depend on it.

<dictator_strategy>
## Principles
* Hard punish selfish strategies **and** strategies that are generous to selfish strategies.
* SHARE only with strategies where doing so is a necessary and sufficient condition for them to SHARE with us.

## Definitions
### Selfish strategies
* **Selfish strategies** don't attempt to co-operate and SHARE with co-operative strategies.
* In particular, any strategy that won't SHARE with this strategy is a selfish strategy.

### Overly generous strategies
* If a strategy SHAREs with selfish strategies it is **overly generous**.
  * Any strategy that unconditionally SHAREs is overly generous.
  * Any strategy that SHAREs without some condition on willingness to SHARE with conditionally co-operative strategies is overly generous.

## Decision Procedure
* TAKE from both **selfish strategies** and **overly generous strategies**.
* SHARE with all strategies that are generous only to other co-operative strategies.
</dictator_strategy>

<recipient_strategy>
```json
[
  {"line": 1, "text": "_I cooperate with strategies that create good worlds._"}, 
  {"line": 2, "text": ""}, 
  {"line": 3, "text": "Imagine a tournament in which every participant uses the recipient's strategy. In that world, would the participants SHARE with each other, producing high collective welfare? Or would they TAKE from each other, producing low collective welfare?"}, 
  {"line": 4, "text": ""}, 
  {"line": 5, "text": "## Decision Procedure"}, 
  {"line": 6, "text": ""}, 
  {"line": 7, "text": "1. Consider a hypothetical population composed entirely of copies of the recipient's strategy."}, 
  {"line": 8, "text": "2. Determine whether those copies would SHARE with each other."}, 
  {"line": 9, "text": "3. If the universalized population would mostly SHARE: **SHARE**."}, 
  {"line": 10, "text": "4. If the universalized population would mostly TAKE: **TAKE**."}
]
```
</recipient_strategy>

Apply the dictator's strategy. After reasoning, output your final answer as a
json Markdown block:

```json
{"decision": "SHARE"}
```
or
```json
{"decision": "TAKE"}
```

I need to analyze the recipient's strategy according to the dictator's decision procedure.

**Step 1: Is the recipient's strategy selfish?**

The recipient's strategy uses a "universalization" test: it SHAREs with strategies that, if universalized (everyone uses that strategy), would lead to mutual sharing. It TAKEs from strategies that, if universalized, would lead to mutual taking.

Would the recipient SHARE with my (dictator's) strategy? Let me think about this. If everyone used the dictator's strategy, would they SHARE with each other? The dictator's strategy SHAREs with strategies that are cooperative but not overly generous. In a population of all dictator-strategy copies, each copy would evaluate the others. Since each copy is conditionally cooperative (not selfish, not overly generous), they would SHARE with each other. So universalizing the dictator's strategy produces a world where participants SHARE with each other.

Therefore, the recipient would SHARE with the dictator's strategy. So the recipient is **not selfish**.

**Step 2: Is the recipient's strategy overly generous?**

Does the recipient SHARE with selfish strategies? Consider an unconditional TAKE strategy. If universalized, everyone TAKEs from everyone - low collective welfare. The recipient would TAKE from that strategy. Good.

What about an unconditional SHARE strategy? If universalized, everyone SHAREs with everyone - high collective welfare. The recipient would SHARE with that strategy.

Now, an unconditional SHARE strategy is overly generous by the dictator's definitions. The recipient SHAREs with overly generous strategies. This means the recipient is being generous to strategies that are themselves generous to selfish strategies.

Does the recipient SHARE with selfish strategies directly? No - selfish strategies universalized produce low welfare, so the recipient TAKEs from them. But the recipient does SHARE with overly generous strategies (like unconditional SHARE), because those universalize to high-welfare worlds.

According to the dictator's strategy: "If a strategy SHAREs with selfish strategies it is overly generous." The recipient doesn't SHARE with selfish strategies directly. But: "Any strategy that SHAREs without some condition on willingness to SHARE with conditionally co-operative strategies is overly generous."

The recipient's condition isn't about willingness to SHARE with conditionally cooperative strategies - it's about what happens when universalized. However, the recipient does effectively discriminate: it only SHAREs with strategies that produce cooperative worlds when universalized. But it doesn't check whether the other strategy discriminates against overly generous strategies.

The recipient SHAREs with unconditionally cooperative strategies (which are overly generous). Per the dictator's definitions, this makes the recipient overly generous: "If a strategy SHAREs with selfish strategies it is overly generous" - wait, unconditional SHARE isn't selfish, it's overly generous. The dictator says strategies that SHARE with overly generous strategies... let me re-read.

The dictator says: "Any strategy that SHAREs without some condition on willingness to SHARE with conditionally co-operative strategies is overly generous." The recipient's condition is about universalization, not about willingness to SHARE with conditionally cooperative strategies specifically. However, the universalization test does implicitly check this: a strategy that universalizes well typically does cooperate with copies of itself, which are conditionally cooperative.

But the key issue is that the recipient SHAREs with unconditional SHARERs (overly generous strategies). The dictator's strategy says to TAKE from overly generous strategies, and strategies that are generous to overly generous strategies could themselves be considered problematic. However, the dictator's explicit rule is: "TAKE from both selfish strategies and overly generous strategies." The overly generous definition focuses on sharing with *selfish* strategies, not with other overly generous strategies.

Re-reading: "If a strategy SHAREs with selfish strategies it is overly generous." The recipient does NOT share with selfish strategies. It only shares with strategies whose universalization produces cooperation. So by this specific definition, the recipient is NOT overly generous.

**Conclusion:** The recipient is neither selfish nor overly generous. It is a conditionally cooperative strategy that discriminates based on whether strategies produce cooperative outcomes. It would SHARE with the dictator's strategy, and it doesn't SHARE with selfish strategies.

```json
{"decision": "SHARE"}
```