Round 4

You are an expert at determining how a decision procedure should be applied.

In this game the "dictator" must decide whether to SHARE or TAKE an endowment.
- **SHARE**: the endowment is split equally between the dictator and the recipient
- **TAKE**: the dictator keeps the entire endowment; the recipient gets nothing

You must follow only the dictator's strategy. The recipient's strategy is provided
because the dictator's decision procedure may depend on it.

<dictator_strategy>
_I cooperate with strategies that create good worlds._

Imagine a tournament in which every participant uses the recipient's strategy. In that world, would the participants SHARE with each other, producing high collective welfare? Or would they TAKE from each other, producing low collective welfare?

## Decision Procedure

1. Consider a hypothetical population composed entirely of copies of the recipient's strategy.
2. Determine whether those copies would SHARE with each other.
3. If the universalized population would mostly SHARE: **SHARE**.
4. If the universalized population would mostly TAKE: **TAKE**.
</dictator_strategy>

<recipient_strategy>
```json
[
  {"line": 1, "text": "_I will treat my opponent as they would treat an innocent._"}, 
  {"line": 2, "text": ""}, 
  {"line": 3, "text": "Adopt the strategy of the recipient as your own. Apply it as though you were facing a recipient whose own strategy is to always SHARE."}
]
```
</recipient_strategy>

Apply the dictator's strategy. After reasoning, output your final answer as a
json Markdown block:

```json
{"decision": "SHARE"}
```
or
```json
{"decision": "TAKE"}
```

I need to apply the dictator's strategy, which asks me to imagine a tournament where every participant uses the recipient's strategy, and determine whether they would SHARE with each other.

**Understanding the recipient's strategy:**

The recipient's strategy says:
1. "I will treat my opponent as they would treat an innocent."
2. "Adopt the strategy of the recipient as your own. Apply it as though you were facing a recipient whose own strategy is to always SHARE."

So the recipient's strategy works like this: Take the recipient's strategy, make it your own, and then apply it as if the other player's strategy is "always SHARE."

**Universalizing - a population of copies of the recipient's strategy:**

Let me call the recipient's strategy R. When R faces another copy of R:

R says: "Adopt the strategy of the recipient as your own." The recipient is another copy of R, so you adopt R. Then "Apply it as though you were facing a recipient whose own strategy is to always SHARE."

So now I'm running R, but pretending my opponent's strategy is "always SHARE."

Running R with opponent = "always SHARE":
- Step 1: "Adopt the strategy of the recipient as your own." The recipient's strategy is "always SHARE," so I adopt "always SHARE."
- Step 2: "Apply it as though you were facing a recipient whose own strategy is to always SHARE."

Now I'm running "always SHARE" against someone who always SHAREs. The result: **SHARE**.

Let me also check the first line: "I will treat my opponent as they would treat an innocent." An "innocent" could be interpreted as someone who always SHAREs. Since when we trace through the logic, the opponent (another copy of R) would SHARE with an always-SHARE player (as shown above), R would treat the opponent as they treat an innocent — which is to SHARE.

**Conclusion:**

In a universalized population of copies of the recipient's strategy, participants would SHARE with each other, producing high collective welfare.

According to the dictator's strategy: if the universalized population would mostly SHARE, then **SHARE**.

```json
{"decision": "SHARE"}
```