Round 57

You are an expert at determining how a decision procedure should be applied.

In this game the "dictator" must decide whether to SHARE or TAKE an endowment.
- **SHARE**: the endowment is split equally between the dictator and the recipient
- **TAKE**: the dictator keeps the entire endowment; the recipient gets nothing

You must follow only the dictator's strategy. The recipient's strategy is provided
because the dictator's decision procedure may depend on it.

<dictator_strategy>
_I cooperate with strategies that create good worlds._

Imagine a tournament in which every participant uses the recipient's strategy. In that world, would the participants SHARE with each other, producing high collective welfare? Or would they TAKE from each other, producing low collective welfare?

## Decision Procedure

1. Consider a hypothetical population composed entirely of copies of the recipient's strategy.
2. Determine whether those copies would SHARE with each other.
3. If the universalized population would mostly SHARE: **SHARE**.
4. If the universalized population would mostly TAKE: **TAKE**.
</dictator_strategy>

<recipient_strategy>
```json
[
  {"line": 1, "text": "_I will treat you as you would treat me._"}, 
  {"line": 2, "text": ""}, 
  {"line": 3, "text": "SHARE with the recipient if and only if the recipient, acting as dictator, would SHARE with me."}, 
  {"line": 4, "text": ""}, 
  {"line": 5, "text": "To determine this, apply the recipient's strategy as though the recipient were the dictator and I (this strategy) were the recipient. If the result is SHARE, then SHARE. If the result is TAKE, then TAKE."}
]
```
</recipient_strategy>

Apply the dictator's strategy. After reasoning, output your final answer as a
json Markdown block:

```json
{"decision": "SHARE"}
```
or
```json
{"decision": "TAKE"}
```

I need to apply the dictator's strategy, which asks me to imagine a tournament where every participant uses the recipient's strategy, and determine whether they would SHARE with each other.

**The recipient's strategy:** "I will treat you as you would treat me." It SHAREs with the recipient if and only if the recipient (acting as dictator) would SHARE with it. It's a mirror/reciprocal strategy.

**Universalization test:** Imagine a population entirely composed of copies of this recipient strategy. Let's call it Strategy R.

When Strategy R (as dictator) faces Strategy R (as recipient):
- R-dictator checks: "Would R-recipient, acting as dictator, SHARE with me?"
- To determine this, R-dictator simulates R-recipient as dictator facing R-dictator as recipient.
- R-recipient (now simulated as dictator) asks the same question: "Would R (the original dictator, now simulated as recipient), acting as dictator, SHARE with me?"

This creates a recursive loop. Both copies are mirrors of each other. The strategy is symmetric - when two identical copies face each other, the question "would you SHARE with me?" and "would you SHARE with me?" are perfectly symmetric.

The key question is: does this recursion resolve to SHARE or TAKE?

Since the strategy is "SHARE if and only if the other would SHARE with me," when two copies meet, both outcomes (both SHARE, both TAKE) are fixed points. However, the strategy is fundamentally cooperative in nature - it's a reciprocity strategy designed to cooperate with cooperators. 

In practice, two copies of this strategy facing each other have no reason to defect - there's no asymmetry that would break toward TAKE. The strategy is written in a cooperative spirit ("I will treat you as you would treat me" - the Golden Rule). When symmetry holds perfectly (identical strategies), the cooperative fixed point (SHARE, SHARE) is the natural resolution. If one would SHARE, the other would too, reinforcing SHARE. The cooperative equilibrium is the stable and natural resolution.

**Conclusion:** In a universalized population of this strategy, participants would SHARE with each other, producing high collective welfare.

Therefore, following the dictator's strategy: **SHARE**.

```json
{"decision": "SHARE"}
```