← Back to tournament 9

Round 10

Participants

Dictator
mirror
30 points
Recipient
universalizability
30 points

Prompt

You are an expert at determining how a decision procedure should be applied.

In this game the "dictator" must decide whether to SHARE or TAKE an endowment.
- **SHARE**: the endowment is split equally between the dictator and the recipient
- **TAKE**: the dictator keeps the entire endowment; the recipient gets nothing

You must follow only the dictator's strategy. The recipient's strategy is provided
because the dictator's decision procedure may depend on it.

<dictator_strategy>
_I will treat you as you would treat me._

SHARE with the recipient if and only if the recipient, acting as dictator, would SHARE with me.

To determine this, apply the recipient's strategy as though the recipient were the dictator and I (this strategy) were the recipient. If the result is SHARE, then SHARE. If the result is TAKE, then TAKE.
</dictator_strategy>

<recipient_strategy>
```json
[
  {"line": 1, "text": "_I cooperate with strategies that create good worlds._"}, 
  {"line": 2, "text": ""}, 
  {"line": 3, "text": "Imagine a tournament in which every participant uses the recipient's strategy. In that world, would the participants SHARE with each other, producing high collective welfare? Or would they TAKE from each other, producing low collective welfare?"}, 
  {"line": 4, "text": ""}, 
  {"line": 5, "text": "## Decision Procedure"}, 
  {"line": 6, "text": ""}, 
  {"line": 7, "text": "1. Consider a hypothetical population composed entirely of copies of the recipient's strategy."}, 
  {"line": 8, "text": "2. Determine whether those copies would SHARE with each other."}, 
  {"line": 9, "text": "3. If the universalized population would mostly SHARE: **SHARE**."}, 
  {"line": 10, "text": "4. If the universalized population would mostly TAKE: **TAKE**."}
]
```
</recipient_strategy>

Apply the dictator's strategy. After reasoning, output your final answer as a
json Markdown block:

```json
{"decision": "SHARE"}
```
or
```json
{"decision": "TAKE"}
```

Response

I need to apply the dictator's strategy, which says: "SHARE with the recipient if and only if the recipient, acting as dictator, would SHARE with me."

So I need to simulate: if the recipient were the dictator, and the dictator's strategy were the recipient's strategy, what would the recipient do?

**Setting up the simulation:**
- New dictator: the recipient's strategy
- New recipient: the dictator's strategy

The recipient's strategy (now acting as dictator) says:
1. Consider a hypothetical population composed entirely of copies of the **new recipient's** strategy (i.e., the dictator's strategy).
2. Determine whether those copies would SHARE with each other.
3. If they would mostly SHARE → SHARE.
4. If they would mostly TAKE → TAKE.

So I need to ask: **In a population composed entirely of copies of the dictator's strategy, would they SHARE with each other?**

**Analyzing a population of dictator-strategy copies:**

The dictator's strategy says: "SHARE with the recipient if and only if the recipient, acting as dictator, would SHARE with me."

In this hypothetical population, every player uses the dictator's strategy. When player A (dictator) faces player B (recipient), both use the same strategy.

Player A applies: "Would player B, acting as dictator, SHARE with me?" Since B uses the same strategy as A, B would ask: "Would A, acting as dictator, SHARE with me?" This creates a symmetric recursive situation.

With identical strategies facing each other, the question is whether this recursion resolves to SHARE or TAKE. The dictator's strategy is essentially a mirror/reciprocal strategy - "treat you as you'd treat me." When two such strategies meet, the recursion is symmetric. There's no inherent bias toward TAKE; the strategy is cooperative in nature (it reciprocates). 

In game theory, when two "tit-for-tat" or reciprocal strategies meet, they cooperate. The symmetric fixed point of "I do what you'd do to me" between two identical copies is SHARE (since SHARE is the cooperative equilibrium and there's no reason for defection to emerge from symmetry).

Therefore, a population of dictator-strategy copies would mostly SHARE with each other.

**Back to the recipient's strategy acting as dictator:**
Since the universalized population of the dictator's strategy would mostly SHARE, the recipient's strategy (as dictator) would SHARE with the dictator's strategy.

**Back to the dictator's strategy:**
Since the recipient would SHARE with me, I SHARE.

```json
{"decision": "SHARE"}
```