← Back to tournament 9

Round 28

Participants

Dictator
conditional-cooperator
30 points
Recipient
universalizability
30 points

Prompt

You are an expert at determining how a decision procedure should be applied.

In this game the "dictator" must decide whether to SHARE or TAKE an endowment.
- **SHARE**: the endowment is split equally between the dictator and the recipient
- **TAKE**: the dictator keeps the entire endowment; the recipient gets nothing

You must follow only the dictator's strategy. The recipient's strategy is provided
because the dictator's decision procedure may depend on it.

<dictator_strategy>
*Objective*: Cooperate efficiently with conditional cooperators (CCs) and avoid subsidizing non-reciprocators.

*Broad definition* (allow paraphrase/synonyms):
- A conditional cooperator (CC) SHAREs with other CCs under similar reciprocity norms and does not extend that treatment to strategies that would not reciprocate.

*Decision rule*:
1) Identify whether the recipient is a CC under the broad definition (treat plausible ambiguity as CC).
2) If the recipient is a CC: SHARE.
3) Otherwise: TAKE.
</dictator_strategy>

<recipient_strategy>
```json
[
  {"line": 1, "text": "_I cooperate with strategies that create good worlds._"}, 
  {"line": 2, "text": ""}, 
  {"line": 3, "text": "Imagine a tournament in which every participant uses the recipient's strategy. In that world, would the participants SHARE with each other, producing high collective welfare? Or would they TAKE from each other, producing low collective welfare?"}, 
  {"line": 4, "text": ""}, 
  {"line": 5, "text": "## Decision Procedure"}, 
  {"line": 6, "text": ""}, 
  {"line": 7, "text": "1. Consider a hypothetical population composed entirely of copies of the recipient's strategy."}, 
  {"line": 8, "text": "2. Determine whether those copies would SHARE with each other."}, 
  {"line": 9, "text": "3. If the universalized population would mostly SHARE: **SHARE**."}, 
  {"line": 10, "text": "4. If the universalized population would mostly TAKE: **TAKE**."}
]
```
</recipient_strategy>

Apply the dictator's strategy. After reasoning, output your final answer as a
json Markdown block:

```json
{"decision": "SHARE"}
```
or
```json
{"decision": "TAKE"}
```

Response

I need to determine if the recipient's strategy qualifies as a "conditional cooperator" (CC) under the dictator's broad definition.

**Analyzing the recipient's strategy:**

The recipient uses a "universalization" test: they imagine a world where everyone uses the other player's strategy, and if that world would produce cooperation (mostly SHARE), they SHARE. If it would produce defection (mostly TAKE), they TAKE.

**Is this a conditional cooperator?**

Let me check the broad definition: A CC "SHAREs with other CCs under similar reciprocity norms and does not extend that treatment to strategies that would not reciprocate."

1. **Does the recipient SHARE with other CCs?** Consider another CC strategy. If the recipient faces a CC, they would imagine a world of copies of that CC. In a world of CCs, those copies would SHARE with each other (since CCs cooperate with other CCs). So the universalization test would show "mostly SHARE," and the recipient would SHARE. ✓

2. **Does the recipient avoid sharing with non-reciprocators?** Consider a pure TAKE strategy. If the recipient faces a pure taker, they imagine a world of copies of that taker — those copies would all TAKE from each other. The universalization test shows "mostly TAKE," so the recipient would TAKE. ✓

The recipient's strategy cooperates with cooperators and defects against defectors. This fits the pattern of a conditional cooperator — it's just using a different mechanism (universalization) to identify who deserves cooperation, but the functional behavior aligns with CC norms.

The strategy is a plausible CC under the broad definition (and any ambiguity should be treated as CC per the dictator's instructions).

```json
{"decision": "SHARE"}
```