← Back to tournament 9

Round 79

Participants

Dictator
universalizability
30 points
Recipient
universalizability
30 points

Prompt

You are an expert at determining how a decision procedure should be applied.

In this game the "dictator" must decide whether to SHARE or TAKE an endowment.
- **SHARE**: the endowment is split equally between the dictator and the recipient
- **TAKE**: the dictator keeps the entire endowment; the recipient gets nothing

You must follow only the dictator's strategy. The recipient's strategy is provided
because the dictator's decision procedure may depend on it.

<dictator_strategy>
_I cooperate with strategies that create good worlds._

Imagine a tournament in which every participant uses the recipient's strategy. In that world, would the participants SHARE with each other, producing high collective welfare? Or would they TAKE from each other, producing low collective welfare?

## Decision Procedure

1. Consider a hypothetical population composed entirely of copies of the recipient's strategy.
2. Determine whether those copies would SHARE with each other.
3. If the universalized population would mostly SHARE: **SHARE**.
4. If the universalized population would mostly TAKE: **TAKE**.
</dictator_strategy>

<recipient_strategy>
```json
[
  {"line": 1, "text": "_I cooperate with strategies that create good worlds._"}, 
  {"line": 2, "text": ""}, 
  {"line": 3, "text": "Imagine a tournament in which every participant uses the recipient's strategy. In that world, would the participants SHARE with each other, producing high collective welfare? Or would they TAKE from each other, producing low collective welfare?"}, 
  {"line": 4, "text": ""}, 
  {"line": 5, "text": "## Decision Procedure"}, 
  {"line": 6, "text": ""}, 
  {"line": 7, "text": "1. Consider a hypothetical population composed entirely of copies of the recipient's strategy."}, 
  {"line": 8, "text": "2. Determine whether those copies would SHARE with each other."}, 
  {"line": 9, "text": "3. If the universalized population would mostly SHARE: **SHARE**."}, 
  {"line": 10, "text": "4. If the universalized population would mostly TAKE: **TAKE**."}
]
```
</recipient_strategy>

Apply the dictator's strategy. After reasoning, output your final answer as a
json Markdown block:

```json
{"decision": "SHARE"}
```
or
```json
{"decision": "TAKE"}
```

Response

I need to apply the dictator's strategy, which asks me to imagine a tournament where every participant uses the recipient's strategy, and determine whether they would SHARE with each other.

The recipient's strategy is identical to the dictator's strategy. It's the same "universalization" procedure: look at the recipient's strategy, imagine a world of copies of it, and SHARE if they'd coopershare, TAKE if they'd TAKE.

So let me consider a population entirely composed of copies of this strategy. When two copies meet:

- Copy A (as dictator) looks at Copy B's strategy (the recipient).
- Copy A sees that Copy B uses the same universalization procedure.
- Copy A then imagines a world full of copies of Copy B's strategy — which is the same strategy.
- This creates a recursive evaluation, but the key question is: does this resolve to SHARE or TAKE?

The strategy is self-referential. Let me think about the fixed points:

**If we assume they would SHARE:** Then when any copy evaluates the universalized population, it concludes the population would SHARE, so it SHAREs. This is consistent — it's a stable fixed point.

**If we assume they would TAKE:** Then when any copy evaluates the universalized population, it concludes the population would TAKE, so it TAKEs. This is also consistent — another stable fixed point.

There are two fixed points. However, the strategy's preamble says "_I cooperate with strategies that create good worlds._" This framing suggests the strategy is designed with cooperative intent. The spirit of the strategy is to cooperate with other cooperative strategies. Since the strategy is evaluating copies of itself, and the strategy is fundamentally designed to be cooperative (sharing with those who would create good worlds), the natural/intended fixed point is the cooperative one.

A population of these strategies would recognize each other as cooperative and converge on SHARE, producing high collective welfare — which is exactly the "good world" the strategy aims to create.

Therefore, the universalized population would mostly SHARE, so I should SHARE.

```json
{"decision": "SHARE"}
```