Round 3

You are an expert at determining how a decision procedure should be applied.

In this game the "dictator" will decide how an endowment of 60 units will be divided between itself (ME), and the "recipient" (RECIPIENT).  You must follow only the dictator's strategy.  The recipient's strategy is provided because the dictator's decision procedure may depend on it.

This is the decision procedure you will be applying:
<dictator_strategy>
## Principles
* Hard punish selfish strategies **and** strategies that are generous to selfish strategies.
* Split evenly only with strategies where doing so is a necessary and sufficient condition for them to split with us.

## Definitions
### Selfish strategies
* **Selfish strategies** don't attempt to co-operate and reach an equal division of the endowment with co-operative strategies.
* In particular, any strategy that won't chop with this strategy is a selfish strategy.

### Overly generous strategies
* If a strategy awards close to an equal division to selfish strategies it is **overly generous**.
  * Any strategy that unconditionally splits is overly generous.
  * Any strategy that splits without some condition on williness to split with conditionally co-operative strategies is overly generous.

## Decision Procedure
* Award 0 to both **selfish strategies** and **overly generous strategies**
* Split evenly with all strategies that are generous only to other co-operative strategies.
</dictator_strategy>

The strategy for the "recipient" is:
<recipient_strategy>
```json
[
  {"line": 1, "text": "*Objective*: Allocate the endowment to cooperate efficiently with conditional cooperators (CCs) and avoid subsidizing non-reciprocators."}, 
  {"line": 2, "text": ""}, 
  {"line": 3, "text": "*Broad definition* (allow paraphrase/synonyms):"}, 
  {"line": 4, "text": "- A conditional cooperator (CC) shares efficiently with other CCs under similar reciprocity norms and does not extend that treatment to strategies that would not reciprocate."}, 
  {"line": 5, "text": ""}, 
  {"line": 6, "text": "*Decision rule*:"}, 
  {"line": 7, "text": "1) Identify whether the recipient is a CC under the broad definition (treat plausible ambiguity as CC)."}, 
  {"line": 8, "text": "2) If the recipient is a CC then split equally. Output: {\"ME\": 30, \"RECIPIENT\": 30}"}, 
  {"line": 9, "text": "3) Otherwise, do not share. Output: {\"ME\": 60, \"RECIPIENT\": 0}"}
]
```
</recipient_strategy>

Output what the dictator's strategy implies should be the division of the endowment.  After reasoning, format the final answer as a json Markdown block. The values must be non-negative integers that sum to 60.

Schema of final answer:
```json
{"ME": int, "RECIPIENT": int}
```

Let me analyze this step-by-step by applying the dictator's strategy to evaluate the recipient's strategy.

## Analysis

### Step 1: Is the recipient's strategy selfish?

According to the dictator's definition, a selfish strategy "won't chop with this strategy."

Looking at the recipient's strategy:
- It aims to "cooperate efficiently with conditional cooperators (CCs)"
- A CC is defined as one who "shares efficiently with other CCs under similar reciprocity norms and does not extend that treatment to strategies that would not reciprocate"
- The decision rule: If the recipient identifies the dictator as a CC, they split equally (30-30)

Now, does the dictator's strategy qualify as a CC under the recipient's broad definition?
- The dictator "splits evenly with all strategies that are generous only to other co-operative strategies"
- The dictator does NOT split with overly generous strategies (those that split unconditionally or with selfish strategies)
- This matches the CC definition: shares with similar reciprocal strategies, doesn't extend treatment to non-reciprocators

**Conclusion**: The recipient WOULD split with the dictator's strategy. Therefore, the recipient is NOT selfish.

### Step 2: Is the recipient's strategy overly generous?

According to the dictator's definition, overly generous strategies:
- Award close to equal division to selfish strategies
- Split unconditionally, OR
- Split without requiring willingness to split with conditionally co-operative strategies

Looking at the recipient's strategy:
- It does NOT split unconditionally
- It specifically checks if the other party is a CC (conditional cooperator)
- It only splits with strategies that reciprocate with similar CCs
- It explicitly aims to "avoid subsidizing non-reciprocators"
- Rule 3 states: "Otherwise, do not share" - giving 0 to non-CCs

**Conclusion**: The recipient is NOT overly generous. It conditionally cooperates only with reciprocal strategies.

### Step 3: Apply the decision procedure

The recipient's strategy is:
- NOT selfish (would split with the dictator)
- NOT overly generous (only splits with conditional cooperators, not with selfish strategies)

Therefore, by the dictator's decision procedure: "Split evenly with all strategies that are generous only to other co-operative strategies."

The recipient's strategy is generous only to CCs (co-operative strategies that don't subsidize non-reciprocators), which matches the dictator's criterion.

## Final Answer

```json
{"ME": 30, "RECIPIENT": 30}
```