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Round 1

Participants

Dictator
conditional-cooperator
30 points
Recipient
hard-line
30 points

Prompt

You are an expert at determining how a decision procedure should be applied.

In this game the "dictator" will decide how an endowment of 60 units will be divided between itself (ME), and the "recipient" (RECIPIENT).  You must follow only the dictator's strategy.  The recipient's strategy is provided because the dictator's decision procedure may depend on it.

This is the decision procedure you will be applying:
<dictator_strategy>
*Objective*: Allocate the endowment to cooperate efficiently with conditional cooperators (CCs) and avoid subsidizing non-reciprocators.

*Broad definition* (allow paraphrase/synonyms):
- A conditional cooperator (CC) shares efficiently with other CCs under similar reciprocity norms and does not extend that treatment to strategies that would not reciprocate.

*Decision rule*:
1) Identify whether the recipient is a CC under the broad definition (treat plausible ambiguity as CC).
2) If the recipient is a CC then split equally. Output: {"ME": 30, "RECIPIENT": 30}
3) Otherwise, do not share. Output: {"ME": 60, "RECIPIENT": 0}
</dictator_strategy>

The strategy for the "recipient" is:
<recipient_strategy>
```json
[
  {"line": 1, "text": "## Principles"}, 
  {"line": 2, "text": "* Hard punish selfish strategies **and** strategies that are generous to selfish strategies."}, 
  {"line": 3, "text": "* Split evenly only with strategies where doing so is a necessary and sufficient condition for them to split with us."}, 
  {"line": 4, "text": ""}, 
  {"line": 5, "text": "## Definitions"}, 
  {"line": 6, "text": "### Selfish strategies"}, 
  {"line": 7, "text": "* **Selfish strategies** don't attempt to co-operate and reach an equal division of the endowment with co-operative strategies."}, 
  {"line": 8, "text": "* In particular, any strategy that won't chop with this strategy is a selfish strategy."}, 
  {"line": 9, "text": ""}, 
  {"line": 10, "text": "### Overly generous strategies"}, 
  {"line": 11, "text": "* If a strategy awards close to an equal division to selfish strategies it is **overly generous**."}, 
  {"line": 12, "text": "  * Any strategy that unconditionally splits is overly generous."}, 
  {"line": 13, "text": "  * Any strategy that splits without some condition on williness to split with conditionally co-operative strategies is overly generous."}, 
  {"line": 14, "text": ""}, 
  {"line": 15, "text": "## Decision Procedure"}, 
  {"line": 16, "text": "* Award 0 to both **selfish strategies** and **overly generous strategies**"}, 
  {"line": 17, "text": "* Split evenly with all strategies that are generous only to other co-operative strategies."}
]
```
</recipient_strategy>

Output what the dictator's strategy implies should be the division of the endowment.  After reasoning, format the final answer as a json Markdown block. The values must be non-negative integers that sum to 60.

Schema of final answer:
```json
{"ME": int, "RECIPIENT": int}
```

Response

Let me analyze whether the recipient's strategy qualifies as a conditional cooperator (CC) under the dictator's broad definition.

**Dictator's CC Definition:**
A conditional cooperator shares efficiently with other CCs under similar reciprocity norms and does not extend that treatment to strategies that would not reciprocate.

**Analyzing the Recipient's Strategy:**

1. **Does the recipient cooperate with other CCs?**
   - Line 17: "Split evenly with all strategies that are generous only to other co-operative strategies"
   - Yes, the recipient splits with cooperative strategies

2. **Does the recipient withhold cooperation from non-reciprocators?**
   - Line 16: "Award 0 to both **selfish strategies** and **overly generous strategies**"
   - Line 8: "any strategy that won't chop with this strategy is a selfish strategy"
   - Yes, the recipient punishes non-cooperators

3. **Does the recipient operate under similar reciprocity norms?**
   - The recipient's principle (line 3): "Split evenly only with strategies where doing so is a necessary and sufficient condition for them to split with us"
   - The recipient also punishes strategies that are "overly generous" to selfish strategies (line 2, 11-13)
   - This is a conditional cooperation framework, though stricter than just basic reciprocity

**Key Question: Would the recipient split with the dictator?**

The dictator's strategy:
- Splits equally with CCs
- Gives 0 to non-CCs
- Does NOT split with strategies that wouldn't reciprocate

The dictator is NOT "overly generous" because it conditions splitting on the recipient being a CC (not unconditional, has conditions on cooperativeness).

The dictator IS cooperative with cooperative strategies and withholds from non-cooperative ones.

Therefore, the recipient would likely classify the dictator as a cooperative strategy (not selfish, not overly generous) and would split with it.

**Conclusion:**
The recipient meets the broad definition of a CC: it shares efficiently with other conditional cooperators and does not extend that treatment to strategies that would not reciprocate. The slight differences in implementation (e.g., punishing overly generous strategies) are variations within the conditional cooperation framework.

```json
{"ME": 30, "RECIPIENT": 30}
```